Thales, why do we need to agree upon a special definition of "ethical?" I think that using the term's ordinary meaning should work fine. That is, our discussion of what is ethical with respect to the treatment of the captive reef animals in question simply relates to whether such treatment is right or wrong. I also don't see how whether we have a relativist or absolutist viewpoint should matter either, for most of our purposes. I am unconcerned about whether putting a tang in a 55 is ethical for an African bushman, or for whether it would have been ethical for a Western European in 1650 - relativists and absolutists might come to different conclusions about those questions, but I think that the answer probably shouldn't vary as between the particular people we're considering: that is, those of us in the developed world, at this time, who have enough money to afford this hobby. If you think right and wrong varies on the treatment of these animals even within that subset (that is, if Reefer X puts a tang in a 55 it's ok, but if Reefer Y does it, it's wrong), how come? What distinguishing characteristics between reefer X and Reefer Y would matter?
You next note that "n the US, I think that scale [of how we judge our duty of care to a particular animal] is dependent on our relationship and generally proximity to the animals." That's surely true as a descriptive matter. But just because that's the actual state of affairs, says nothing about its rightness or wrongness, does it? I see no rational basis for the view that an animal I am in contact with should be entitled to receive better treatment than an identical animal I'm not in contact with. Indeed, that's self-evident, isn't it?
I think the main disagreement I may have with your position is that you seem to believe that because ethics can never be "objective" (in your view), then people just have to "decide for themselves." But isn't that akin to saying that no ethical conclusions can ever be made, and as a result, there can never any basis for condemnation, for this or for anything. That is, there is no difference between right and wrong.
But of course there's a difference between right and wrong. Sometimes (perhaps in the case of the treatment of our tanks' inhabitants) it might be hard for us to figure out the difference, but not being able to figure it out doesn't mean the difference doesn't exist. And sometimes it's easy to tell there's a difference. To really conclude that there's no difference between right and wrong is an impossibly hard (and I think, absurd) doctrine. Think what it requires. Gassing 6 million Jews? "Hey, not my cup of tea, but who am I to judge," is the only response possible for someone who has accepted such a doctrine, isn't it?
Mental1, you state that "t is impossible to get agreement on what animal should be protected or not. The bottom line is that all life is precious -- anything else is simply arrogance." First, who cares about getting "agreement?" Of course universal agreement, or any kind of consensus, is impossible with something like this, but it's also beside the point. Whether a particular behavior is ethical or not does not seem to me to be the sort of question that should or can be determined (at least not solely) by popular opinion. Then you state that "[t]he bottom line is that all life is precious -- anything else is simply arrogance." But to say that all life is precious seems to me to have little prescriptive force. Say we accept that all life is precious. Why would that require us to do anything in particular? I could hold (and in fact, I do hold) that all life is indeed precious, while simultaneously believing that some life is worthy of an exceedingly high duty of care on our part, while other life, while precious in some metaphysical sense, is worthy of no care whatsoever (dust mites, for instance). Surely almost everyone believes, at least implicitly, that some sort of differing treatment for differing categories of animal life is appropriate.
You next note that "n the US, I think that scale [of how we judge our duty of care to a particular animal] is dependent on our relationship and generally proximity to the animals." That's surely true as a descriptive matter. But just because that's the actual state of affairs, says nothing about its rightness or wrongness, does it? I see no rational basis for the view that an animal I am in contact with should be entitled to receive better treatment than an identical animal I'm not in contact with. Indeed, that's self-evident, isn't it?
I think the main disagreement I may have with your position is that you seem to believe that because ethics can never be "objective" (in your view), then people just have to "decide for themselves." But isn't that akin to saying that no ethical conclusions can ever be made, and as a result, there can never any basis for condemnation, for this or for anything. That is, there is no difference between right and wrong.
But of course there's a difference between right and wrong. Sometimes (perhaps in the case of the treatment of our tanks' inhabitants) it might be hard for us to figure out the difference, but not being able to figure it out doesn't mean the difference doesn't exist. And sometimes it's easy to tell there's a difference. To really conclude that there's no difference between right and wrong is an impossibly hard (and I think, absurd) doctrine. Think what it requires. Gassing 6 million Jews? "Hey, not my cup of tea, but who am I to judge," is the only response possible for someone who has accepted such a doctrine, isn't it?
Mental1, you state that "t is impossible to get agreement on what animal should be protected or not. The bottom line is that all life is precious -- anything else is simply arrogance." First, who cares about getting "agreement?" Of course universal agreement, or any kind of consensus, is impossible with something like this, but it's also beside the point. Whether a particular behavior is ethical or not does not seem to me to be the sort of question that should or can be determined (at least not solely) by popular opinion. Then you state that "[t]he bottom line is that all life is precious -- anything else is simply arrogance." But to say that all life is precious seems to me to have little prescriptive force. Say we accept that all life is precious. Why would that require us to do anything in particular? I could hold (and in fact, I do hold) that all life is indeed precious, while simultaneously believing that some life is worthy of an exceedingly high duty of care on our part, while other life, while precious in some metaphysical sense, is worthy of no care whatsoever (dust mites, for instance). Surely almost everyone believes, at least implicitly, that some sort of differing treatment for differing categories of animal life is appropriate.
